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I. INTRODUCTION
In a classic episode of Star Trek: The Original Series, Captain
James T. Kirk and his crew beam down to the planet Eminiar VII and
discover the planet gripped in a 500 year-old-war.2 To Captain Kirk’s
surprise, the two factions wage war not with tanks or missiles but with
computers and equations.3 When one side achieves a cyber-hit, the other
side receives a computer-generated number of casualties and must terminate
that number of its own citizens in “disintegration rooms” or face an actual
kinetic retaliation from the other side.4 Although clearly the planet depicted
in Star Trek was a hyperbolic view of future conflicts, twenty-first century
war is becoming more and more automated and dependent on computers.5
As illustrated by the 2008 cyber-attack that occurred in the Eurasian country
Georgia, cyber war has become a legitimate threat that must be planned for

1
Comment Editor 2012, Staff Writer 2011, University of Dayton Law Review. J.D., University of
Dayton School of Law, 2012; M.E., University of Dayton; B.A. in History Teaching, Brigham Young
University. Jeffrey Greenley is an Assistant Attorney General in the Ohio Attorney General’s Office and
works in the Education Section. He is married to Stephanie Greenley and is the proud father of two
children. This article is dedicated to his dear mother who passed away during its formulation. The
author also expresses sincere gratitude to Professor Susan W. Brenner, Samuel A. McCray Chair in Law
at the University Of Dayton School Of Law for all of her guidance and mentorship during the writing
process.
2
Star Trek: A Taste of Armageddon (CBS television broadcast Feb. 23, 1967).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare, 42 A.F. L. REV.
173, 174 (1997).
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by our nation’s military.6 This comment seeks to delineate specific rules of
engagement (“ROE”) for self-defense to be used by U.S. military forces in
the cyber realm and justify those rules in both U.S. and international law.
Section II of this comment will provide a brief history of human
warfare, introduce and discuss the purpose of military ROE, give a brief
overview of applicable international law, and summarize what the current,
unclassified version of the U.S. ROE state.
Section III of this comment will begin with a proposal of what,
based on the current state of international law, the ROE for cyber war
should be. These rules will be referred to as “proposed cyber ROE.” This
section will not propose amendments to domestic or international law to
better accommodate cyber war. Instead, it will argue that the ROE should
be based on current interpretations of international law and past U.S.
military precedent.
II. BACKGROUND
The tactics, tools, and laws of warfare have evolved over several
centuries of human conflict.7 Early historical accounts of warfare paint a
picture of utter-lawlessness where civilians, women, and children were all
targeted in combat along with actual soldiers.8 Although brutal and lawless
wars may have been in early history, modern warfare has been civilized by
rigid rules of war and ROE, which attempt to minimize civilian casualties in
military conflicts.9 The earliest accounts of civilizations attempting some
regulation of war include the Hindu, which prohibited the use of poison
arrows, and early Europeans, who outlawed the crossbow and the arbalest.10
Later, Hugo Grotius, a well-known Dutch jurist, was influential in crafting
European laws of war by insisting on “just causes” for war.11 His just
reasons included crimes against morality, like taking what belonged to

6
Eneken Tikk et al., Cyber Attacks Against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified, COOPERATIVE
CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE 4 (Nov. 2008), http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/
documents/Georgia%201%200.pdf. In 2008 Georgia attacked an uncooperative peacekeeping force that
was stationed within their country. Id. The attacked group was sympathetic with other Georgians who
wished to leave Georgia and reunite with Russia. Id. Russia responded with full military force, including
a series of cyber-attacks against important Georgian governmental websites. Id. These attacks were
among the first to be openly sponsored by a nation-state in preparation for a full kinetic military
response. Id. at 4–5.
7
See Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information
Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 179, 179–80 (2006).
8
See generally William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11th Proposal to
Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639 (2004).
9
See Scott D. Sagan, Rules of Engagement, in AVOIDING WAR: PROBLEMS OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT 443, 444–45 (Alexander L. George ed., 1991).
10
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 29 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982).
11
See G.I.A.D. Draper, Grotius’ Place in the Development of Legal Ideas about War, in HUGO
GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 175, 194 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1992).
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others, not keeping your word, or inflicting injury on others.12
The U.S. and Europe took some of the most important initial steps
towards regulating warfare in the nineteenth century.13 U.S. historians point
to the Union Army’s Lieber Code during the Civil War as a major U.S.
attempt in constructing ROE to govern commanders during conflict.14 The
code specifically forbade private citizens from being “murdered, enslaved,
or carried off to distant parts,” and reminded commanders that private
citizens were to be “as little disturbed in [their] private relations as the
commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant . . . .”15 A few years
later, the European community took further steps towards civilizing war and
drafted the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.16
The Hague
Conventions delineated rules to be used on an international level during war
on both the land and sea.17
Rules of war and ROE have changed and evolved over time to keep
up with each new war’s strategy and technology.18 It is extremely difficult
for military policy makers to stay ahead of changes between conflicts.19
Technological changes between World War I (“WWI”) and World War II
(“WWII”) provide an example of this problem.20 Convinced that any
second conflict would be a WWI trench-war, the French constructed an
elaborate bunker system on their border with Germany named the Maginot
line.21 Unfortunately for the French, by the time WWII occurred German
technology had so advanced that the Germans could either simply fly over
the defenses or navigate around the Maginot line’s break in the Ardennes
Forest.22 Despite their best efforts, the French were not ready for the type of
warfare that this conflict would involve, and as a result, were soon occupied
by German forces.23
In our modern era, the U.S. military must try to avoid a similar
12

Id.
See e.g., DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 9, at 29; E. D. Townsend, General
Orders 100, in 3 U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, 148–64 (Fred C. Ainsworth & Joseph
W. Kirkley eds., 1899).
14
See Townsend, supra note 13, at 148–64, for the complete text of the Lieber Code.
15
Id. at 150–51.
16
Manley O. Hudson, Present Status of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, 25 AM. J. INT’L
L. 114, 114–15 (1931).
17
Id. For a relevant portion of the Hague Conventions, see infra note 37.
18
The Lieber Code, for example, noticed the ever-changing nature of war by stating “[m]odern
times are distinguished from earlier ages by the existence at one and the same time of many nations and
great governments related to one another in close intercourse.” Townsend, supra note 13, at 151.
19
See Brown, supra note 7, at 179.
20
See Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 107 (2004).
21
See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Re-Thinking Regulation in the Era of Global Securities
Markets, Speech at the Thirty-fourth Annual Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 24, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch012407cc.htm.
22
Id.
23
Id.
13
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mistake and stay one step ahead in both technology and policy in the cyber
realm. Current analysts and recent events in Georgia and Egypt suggest
that, if or when another conflict starts, the cyber realm will play a major
role.24 Top U.S. military officials concur with this prediction, and in 2002
President George W. Bush signed into law National Security Presidential
Directive 16 (“Order 16”), which authorized the U.S. to create cyber ROE.25
In June 2011, President Obama signed executive orders which reportedly
adopted cyber ROE which the Pentagon had created under Order 16.26 The
specific rules of these orders are classified, although the Pentagon did
release a small, unclassified version, which discussed broad ROE principles
while not giving away any specific strategy.27 Despite the confidentiality
regarding the rules, some U.S. officials have provided an idea of what the
classified cyber ROE may contain by publically commenting on them.28
A. What are the U.S. ROE?
To begin, what are ROE and what do they govern? U.S. ROE are
broad rules promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to help
provide American on-site commanders guidance in both self-defense and
mission accomplishment.29 Sections of the current U.S. ROE that deal with
self-defense are mostly unclassified; portions of the latest version were
made public in January 2000.30 ROE dealing with mission accomplishment
outline specific guidance for the day-to-day operations of our nation’s
military in a specific geographic area and are kept confidential.31 ROE are
generally made up of two different categories of rules.32 The first category
is made up of military actions, which can be undertaken by a low-ranking
24
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The Egyptian government collapsed and their
President, Hosni Mubarak, was forced to resign after weeks of political unrest and rioting in 2011. David
D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. During the
weeks of tension, several cyber-attacks were carried out against both the Egyptian government and
private Egyptian citizens. Egypt’s Web Disconnect Spurs US Cyber Debate, CYBERSECURITY NEWS,
Feb. 1, 2011, http://cybersecuritynews.org/2011/02/01/egypt%E2%80%99s-web-disconnect-spurs-uscyber-debate. These attacks climaxed with the Egyptian government being forced to disconnect the
Internet to protect themselves and their citizens. Id.
25
Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law, 64
A.F. L. REV. 121, 128 (2009).
26
Lolita C. Baldor, Pentagon Drafts Rules for Cyber Warfare, CNSNEWS.COM, June 22, 2011,
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/pentagon-drafts-rules-cyber-warfare.
27
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE (2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf.
28
Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2011, at
A1, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html; David E.
Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks Acts of War, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2011, at A10.
29
Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge Advocate's Primer, 42
A.F. L. REV. 245, 245 (1997).
30
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CJCSI 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (2000).
31
Sagan, supra note 9, at 444–45.
32
Id. at 444.
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battlefield commander under defined circumstances without authorization
from higher command.33 The second category are actions which can be
carried out only after express authorization is given by a higher command
and govern more violent uses of force or particularly powerful weapons, like
nuclear or chemical weapons.34 Although ROE are developed by the Joint
Chiefs and staff judge advocates, they are broad and flexible: the battlefield
commander always has the final say in implementing the rules in real-life
scenarios, subject to a court-martial should he or she act inappropriately.35
To summarize, “ROE must ensure that combatants bear only the force
necessary to achieve the military objective, engage only necessary targets,
[and] discriminate between combatants and noncombatants, and that in
doing so they do not cause undue suffering.”36 These broad principles are
rooted in both the Hague and Geneva Conventions.37
B. Legal Principles of ROE
ROE are deeply rooted in international law.38 ROE sections that
govern self-defense are derived from the U.N. Charter Article 2(4) as well
as Articles 39 and 51.39 Article 2(4) declares that “[a]ll Members shall
refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”40 Alone, Article 2(4) would prohibit
any force from being used by any nation-state to another, even if that nationstate were provoked.41 However, subsequent articles of the U.N. Charter
condition the absolute prohibition and provide two instances in which a
nation-state can retaliate.42 Article 39 gives the authority for any state to use
military force if the Security Council has expressly authorized use of force
against that state.43 Article 39 was used to justify the bombing of Libya by
the U.S. in March of 2011.44 Article 51 provides a second option and states
that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
33
34
35
36

(2010).

Id.
Id.
10 U.S.C. § 890(2) (2006); Id. at 445.
See Mathew Borton et al., Cyberwar Policy, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 303, 313

37
For example, the Hague Convention of 1907 states that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited” and specifically forbade them from using “arms [or] projectiles . .
. calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 10, at 52.
In addition, “the pillage of a town or place . . . [was] prohibited.” Id. at 53. The Geneva Convention of
1949 further sought to protect civilian casualties stating, “[p]ersons taking no active part in hostilities . . .
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.” Id. at 273. The Geneva Convention also prohibits
civilians from being murdered, taken hostage, or being treated in humiliating or degrading ways. Id.
38
See Borton et al., supra note 36, at 303.
39
U.N. Charter arts. 2, para. 4, 39, 51.
40
Id. art. 2, para. 4.
41
Id.
42
Id. arts. 39, 51.
43
Id. art. 39.
44
Jay Solomon et al., U.N. Clears Way for Attack on Libya, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2011, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703818204576206373350344478.html.
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individual or collective self-defence,” which preserves a nation-state’s
ability to quickly retaliate against any armed attack as long as that retaliation
is attributed to another country; a counter attack is necessary and
proportional to the force used against them; and the response is selective in
only targeting military as opposed to civilian targets.45 Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter has been interpreted as requiring nations who retaliate in selfdefense to only do so out of necessity, in a proportional manner, while
distinguishing between military and civilian targets against an attributed
attacker.46
The principle of necessity requires a nation to respond only to a
hostile act or, under the U.S. interpretation, a demonstration of hostile
intent.47 Although a hostile act is typically easy to identify, a demonstration
of hostile intent that meets the threshold of allowing a counter-attack is
more nebulous.48 If necessity has been met, a commander’s counter-attack
must be proportional or reasonable, in terms of intensity, duration and
magnitude, required to decisively counter the hostile act of demonstration of
hostile intent, but no more than that.49 If proportionality cannot be achieved,
a nation cannot justify an attack under Article 51 and must lobby the U.N.
Security Council to either authorize an attack on the aggressive country or,
if that fails, seek some other international legal redress.50 In addition to
necessity and proportionality, U.S. forces must use the principle of
distinction and distinguish military from civilian targets, carefully launching
attacks that would neutralize military capabilities while limiting the
collateral damage done to civilians.51 Finally, a nation must attribute an
attack to another country with enough specificity to warrant taking action.52
These concepts are usually fairly easy to conceptualize in the real world and
ROE make canonical guidelines for commanders that vary slightly from
theater to theater.53 However, applying these concepts to the cyber realm
has proven to be much more complex.54 Section III of this comment will
45
U.N. Charter art. 51; Waldemar A. Solf, Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities
Under Customary International Law and Under Protocal I, 1 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 117, 131
(1986).
46
See Borton et al., supra note 36, at 312.
47
Grunawalt, supra note 29, at 251.
48
Sagan, supra note 9, at 446–47.
49
See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CJCSI 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES (2005).
50
U.N. Charter arts. 39, 51.
51
Borton et al., supra note 36, at 313.
52
Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Perspective for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar, 5 STRATEGIC
STUD. Q. 81, 88 (2011).
53
Sagan, supra note 9, at 445.
54
For example, would a proportional response to a denial of service (“DoS”) attack by a nationstate on the U.S. be to attack that computer with a DoS attack or to use something that would either
physically or electronically destroy its ability to function? Could the Internet cables under the ocean
supplying access to that computer be severed? Could the civilian or state Internet service provider’s
buildings responsible for providing Internet access be destroyed by a cruise missile? These are all
questions that are to be discussed in this comment.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol38/iss3/4

2013]

PROPOSED CYBERWAR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

433

analyze proposed cyber ROE and justify them under each of the
aforementioned legal principles.
C. Types of Cyber-weapons
Where normal warfare uses weapons like missiles, guns, tanks, and
airplanes, cyber war employs its own variety of cyber-weapons.55 Some
cyber-weapons only temporally disrupt a computer’s functions.56 A Denial
of Service (“DoS”) attack uses thousands of computers to overwhelm a
system’s server by simultaneously trying to access it.57 This type of attack
is inexpensive and can disrupt a website’s ability to perform its function for
a short period while not actually destroying a system.58 Another concept
related to a DoS attack is a “zombie” or bot computer.59 These computers
are nicknamed “zombie” because they are owned and operated by an
individual or group, but have been hijacked by an attacker and used in
coordination with other computers, usually a coordinated DoS attack, to
disrupt a website against their actual owner’s will.60 These attacks can be so
devastating that they result in the complete destruction of hardware, which
must be reinstalled before a computer can recover.61
Other cyber-weapons, however, are more destructive.62 There are
whole hosts of malicious software that, once activated, can disrupt a
computer’s ability to perform a task or provide others with access to its
files.63 One commonly known type, a virus, spreads across a network by
replicating itself within a system.64 Once it has grown to a sufficient size it
performs a task that either corrupts a system or destroys important sensitive
data needed for the computer to function.65 A worm is similar to a virus but
in addition to the ability to perform a task, it replicates itself until a
computer’s memory or server can no longer perform any function.66 At the
same time, a worm also keeps open a doorway to provide an outside
assailant access to the system’s files.67 Finally, cyber warriors have recently
invented the more sophisticated StuxNet worm.68 This weapon is different
than traditional worms because it can target a specific type of computer and
55
See Schaap, supra note 25, at 134. Much of this section is made possible by Major Schaap’s
excellent research and ability to help non-technology users understand complex cyber-weapons.
56
Id. at 172.
57
Id. at 134.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 135.
62
See id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 135–36.
66
Id. at 136.
67
Id.
68
Daniela Oliveira, Cyber-Terrorism & Critical Energy Infrastructure Vulnerability to CyberAttacks, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 519, 526 (2010).
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avoid all others.69 In 2010, this worm infected an Iranian nuclear power
plant and caused critical centrifuge components to destroy themselves and,
in one analyst’s opinion, set Iran’s nuclear program back by two years.70
The cyber-weapons discussed above are not an exhaustive list; they are
merely the more commonly used weapons in cyberspace.71 It is impossible
to describe every weapon at a nation-state’s disposal, as they are constantly
being created by groups around the world.72
It is thus imperative, given the history and necessity of always
staying one step ahead in war, for the U.S. to seriously analyze and establish
ROE for the cyber realm as soon as possible. The issue, however, is what
will the cyber ROE allow while complying with the legal self-defense
principles of ROE: necessity, proportionality, attribution, and distinction.73
In addition, a threshold issue on establishing ROE is whether the military
even has jurisdiction at all in helping police cyberspace.74 In the following
section the reasons for allowing military jurisdiction in cyberspace will be
introduced and substantiated, and this comment’s proposed cyber ROE will
be articulated and then justified under now existing rules of war.75
III. ANALYSIS
A. Who Has Jurisdiction, the Military or Law Enforcement?
A threshold issue in cyber war is whether the military should have
jurisdiction in the cyber arena or if it would be better left to some other
entity. There are various opinions on whether the U.S. military has
jurisdiction, which branch of the military would lead the defense if attacked,
or if cyber war is better left to the FBI or some other contracted entity.76
The argument revolves around the Posse Comitatus Act, an act that prohibits
69

Id.
Yaakov Katz, Stuxnet Virus Set Back Iran’s Nuclear Program by 2 Years, JERUSALEM POST, Dec.
15, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=199475.
71
See Schaap, supra note 25, at 134. The United States military understands that weapons are
being constantly developed and have created a way for new military cyber-weapons to have a legal
review before being used. See, e.g., SEC’Y OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-402, LEGAL
REVIEWS OF WEAPONS AND CYBER CAPABILITIES (2011), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afi51402.pdf (prescribing guidelines and procedures for review of Air Force weapons and cyber capabilities to
ensure legality under domestic and international law).
72
For example, as this paper was being prepared for press a new variation of the StuxNet virus had
been discovered, nicknamed Duqu. William Jackson, Son of Stuxnet Could Usher in a New Chapter in
Cyber Warfare, GOVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS, Nov. 4, 2011, http://gcn.com/articles/2011/11/07/
cybereye-duqu-raises-cyberwar-stakes.aspx.
73
See discussion infra Part III.B.
74
See discussion infra Part III.A.
75
See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
76
See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 52, at 84 (“If [an attack] is truly ‘war,’ then a response under a
national-security legal regime is possible; if not, then treating the matter as a law enforcement issue is
appropriate.”); see also Adam Ebrahim, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford: The United States,
International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 181, 184 (2010) (advocating the
use of private mercenaries in cyber war).
70
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military involvement in criminal investigation, which was passed shortly
after Reconstruction to ensure that the U.S. Army would never have the
police powers it held during that era in the South.77 Those who support a
law enforcement response to cyber-attacks might argue that if a cyber-attack
occurs, it will not likely target U.S. military facilities, but private businesses
like banks, power stations, or other important pieces of infrastructure. They
suggest that the military does not normally respond to criminal acts of
destruction, especially to a civilian building, and thus, the military should
not respond in cyberspace either.78 A law enforcement response is also
appealing since both nation-states and private individuals wage cyber war.79
Because the military cannot attack private citizens, proponents of a law
enforcement model suggest that law enforcement must be allowed to police
the cyber arena.80 Finally, they argue that a law enforcement response
would solve the issue of whether the military can wage war on non-nationstates in general.81
Despite these arguments, the U.S. military must have jurisdiction in
cyberspace and the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the cyber arena.
There are important policy reasons to support military involvement in the
cyber arena. For example, local law enforcement, and even the FBI, likely
lack the funding and expertise to combat certain cyber-attacks.82 In
addition, the U.S. cannot afford to trust the protection of its important
national cyber resources to small groups across the country with no
centralized decision-making ability. At the same time, nation-states and
other hostile groups who seek to destroy U.S. cyber assets would not be
deterred by the possibility of criminal sanctions which law enforcement
provide. This is especially true given the Supreme Court’s extension of both
habeas corpus and due process rights to non-citizen enemy combatants.83

77
18 U.S.C.A. § 1385 (West 2009). For a number of resources explaining why the Posse Comitatus
Act was passed and what kinds of acts it was designed to prevent, see Brian L. Porto, Construction and
Application of Posse Comitatus Act (18. U.S.C.A. 1385), and Similar Predecessor Provisions, Restricting
Use of United States Army and Air Force to Execute Laws, 141 A.L.R. FED. 271 (1997). For an
excellent article reviewing Posse Comitatus issues in cyberspace see Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right:
Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403 (2007).
78
See Susan W. Brenner, "At Light Speed": Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/terrorism/
warfare, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 414 (2007). Professor Brenner does an excellent job in an
article of explaining the history of law enforcement, its evolution, and how there is historical precedent
for some law enforcement jurisdiction in cyberspace.
79
Id. at 435–36.
80
See id. at 458.
81
See id. See generally Brown, supra note 7. For another source advocating for law-enforcement
in cyber war, see Carolyn W. Pumphrey, Introduction to TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: BLENDING LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY STRATEGIES 1, 1–2 (Carolyn W. Pumphrey ed., 2000).
82
That is not to say that these groups are not highly skilled in their normal day-to-day operations
but only that they lack the expertise in the cyber arena. Arguably, the most skilled and well-founded
groups that could respond to a cyber-attack are not the military but specialized private companies like
Microsoft or Google who deal with these kinds of attacks on a daily basis.
83
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (holding that alien enemy combatants held at
Guantanamo Bay prison were entitled to seek a writ of habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
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Under those holdings, enemy combatants can safely target U.S. cyber assets
while being assured that if they are caught and extradited by lawenforcement, they will be given a lawyer and provided some of the
protections the U.S. Constitution provides to its citizens.84 Therefore, only
the promise of a swift military cyber counter-strike will deter cyberattackers from carrying out their plans.
The success that has followed from the recent shift in military
jurisdiction over some terrorist acts supports the conclusion that the military
must have an involved role in cyber conflicts.85 In President Bush’s recent
memoirs, he made a poignant observation about terrorism and its shift from
a criminal matter to one controlled by the military: “[o]n 9/11, it was
obvious the law enforcement approach to terrorism had failed. Suicidal men
willing to fly passenger planes into buildings were not common criminals.
They could not be deterred by the threat of prosecution.”86 After the 9/11
attacks, the U.S. military began to wage war on terrorism and to protect the
nation from a threat that was deemed too large to be handled by local law
enforcement.87 The fact that the U.S. has successfully deterred any major
terrorist attack on U.S. soil since that jurisdictional shift is proof of success
in allowing the military to deal with some threats traditionally dealt with by
law enforcement.88
In addition to strong policy reasons to support a military role, on its
face the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to military jurisdiction in
cyberspace and thus cannot prevent the military from engaging in law
enforcement. Canons of statutory construction illustrate why the Act does
not apply in this situation. First, the Act cannot be found to prevent military
cyber jurisdiction since the original purpose of the statute was to prevent the
kind of military occupation that took place in the South during
Reconstruction from occurring in the future.89 Thus, the Act only prohibits
Reconstruction-like law enforcement activities, and cyber threats are simply
not the kind of law enforcement activities that the Act was designed to
prohibit.90
Opponents to this argument might argue that military
involvement in cyberspace would, in actuality, create an occupation of
cyberspace by a military force that is indistinguishable from those that took
place during the Reconstruction era. However, that argument would fail
507, 539 (2004) (holding that non-citizen detainees held at Guantanamo Bay prison are entitled to some
due process rights).
84
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539.
85
See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 154–57 (2010).
86
Id. at 154.
87
Id.
88
Rick Newman, How America has Underperformed Since 9/11, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
7, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2011/09/07/how-america-has-underperform
ed-since-9-11.
89
See United States v. Allred, 867 F.2d 856, 870–71 (5th Cir. 1989).
90
See id.
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because, unlike the Reconstruction era where commanders essentially made
any decisions necessary to protect freedmen,91 the military would not even
have jurisdiction in cyber war unless certain conditions were present, as
discussed below.92 That check would ensure that the military would clearly
understand when and how it would have jurisdiction to protect the U.S. from
cyber threats and prevent the carte blanche authority given during
Reconstruction.93
Even if a court were to construe the Act as prohibiting a military
presence in cyberspace, the plain language of the statute only lists the Air
Force and Army as being prohibited from assisting in law enforcement; the
Navy is not listed and thus could engage in cyber law enforcement acts
legally.94 This argument is currently limited, as the Department of the Navy
has promulgated regulations that place the Navy within the prohibition set
by the Posse Comitatus Act.95 However, because these are only regulations
they could easily be repealed.96 In addition, the plain language of the Navy
regulation allows high-level officials to override the regulation and allows
law enforcement efforts under certain circumstances.97 That specific clause
was used to allow the Navy to assist law enforcement efforts in the U.S.
War on Drugs.98 These canons of construction arguments, combined with
the aforementioned policy arguments, would likely convince a court to
allow military jurisdiction, or pressure Congress to modify the Posse
Comitatus Act and allow military control of some law enforcement acts in
cyberspace, given their unique threat.99
Thus, although the military clearly should not have a blank check to
defend against every cyber-attack, the U.S. must allow the military
jurisdiction to defend or respond to cyber-attacks against specific entities,
such as power plants or key financial institutions, as they are important

91
See Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction Chapter, 23 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 231, 238 (2008).
92
See infra text accompanying note 100.
93
See Condron, supra note 77, at 419.
94
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987), abrogated by Pollard v. GEO Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 843, 854
(9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
95
United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1974); Borton et al., supra note 36, at 323.
96
Borton et al., supra note 36, at 323. Unlike statutes passed by Congress, which must be formally
repealed by the consensus of both houses, rules promulgated by agencies, like the Department of the
Navy, can quickly be eliminated by their own agency in lieu on a former vote by Congress. Id.
97
Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years
of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86, 149 (2003).
98
Id. at 148. For a discussion of other instances in which the Posse Comitatus Act has been
avoided, see Geoffrey Klingsporn, The Secret Posse: Behind the Veil of National Security, Information
Warfare Is Eclipsing the Difference Between Military and Domestic Affairs, LEGAL AFF., March/April
2005, at 23–24.
99
However, given Congress’s slow moving nature, this is not likely to occur until some type of
large-scale cyber-attack is launched against the U.S. which forces Congress to react and take action.
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centers of national security.100 Therefore, under this comment’s ROE, any
attack against power plants, Executive or Congressional computer networks,
or key financial systems, would warrant a military, as opposed to a lawenforcement, response.101 All other attacks, including those on civilian
internet service providers (“ISPs”), would have to be protected by either
their own security force or some other law enforcement group, since those
attacks would go beyond military jurisdiction as they do not relate to
national security.102
B. Proposed Cyber ROE for the U.S. Military
Because the military must have jurisdiction over some cyberattacks, this comment proposes specific ROE to govern them. Military
commanders would be able to deploy low-level weapons capable of
temporarily stunning enemy computer systems, regardless of complete
attribution and without authorization from command.
In addition,
commanders could deploy these stun cyber-weapons as a direct response to
an enemy’s actual attack or to prevent an enemy’s imminent use of cyberweapons capable of causing real-world physical destruction, as long as a
commander has credible intelligence of that attack. No duty to warn would
apply in cyberspace. These weapons could target attacking computers
individually, or if reasonably attributed to a nation-state or group, dual-use
buildings such as power plants.
However, it is clear that in the event of a large-scale attack, the U.S.
military might have to use large-scale cyber or kinetic weapons that could
permanently destroy a computer system. Although the necessity element
remains the same, a commander could only use weapons if he or she has
reasonably attributed a system or group as being responsible for an attack
and if authorization from a higher command has been given prior to
deploying those weapons. The next four sections of this comment will
further expand these proposed rules and justify them under the self-defense
principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and attribution.
100
See Gorman & Barnes, supra note 28. A U.S. military official agreed with this statement and
remarked, “[i]f you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your
smokestacks." Id. Defining what is and what is not an important center of national security will be
discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 101–02, 162–65. It would appear that the Pentagon
would agree with this comment, having stated publically that it would launch cyber-weapons in response
to “significant cyber attacks directed against the U.S. economy, government or military.” Ellen
Nakashima, Pentagon: Offensive Cyber Attacks Fair Game, WASH. POST, Nov. 15 2011, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/pentagon-offensive-cyber-attacks-fair-game/
2011/11/15/gIQAxQlcON_blog.html.
101
Discerning what is and what is not a system valuable to national security is increasingly difficult.
The U.S. and the World are increasingly inter-connected by technology and lines delineating important
systems become thinner as technology continues to advance.
102
ISPs are interesting because there is arguably nothing more important to national security than
these companies. They are not included in this comment’s definition simply because it is assumed that
because they provide internet service, they likely have their own sophisticated anti-cyber-attack systems
in place.
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1. Necessity
When will a cyber-presence or cyber-attack reach the necessity
threshold and allow a military response? Article 51 of the U.N. Charter only
allows a nation to attack another in self-defense if it is necessary to do so.103
Necessity only allows the military to respond to a hostile act, or an intention
to commit a hostile act, by another.104 Major Dunlap, a well-known cyber
war strategist, suggests that an effects-based analysis should be used to
determine whether or not an act is hostile.105 He suggests that if a cyberattack has the effect of destroying something in the real world, it is a hostile
act under the U.N. Charter, and the U.S. would be allowed to respond.106
Thus, under Major Dunlap’s theory, the transmission of a destructive worm
or virus that leads to destruction in the physical world, like the StuxNet
virus did in destroying actual real-world Iranian property, is an armed attack
that would warrant a military response.107 Any response would have to be
justified under the other U.N. self-defense principles, but the necessity
element would be met.108 This comment’s proposed cyber ROE adopts this
standard and would allow a commander to respond to any cyber-attack that
physically destroys property or data. Those attacks that would only
temporarily disable a system or provide a backdoor into sensitive data would
not be an armed attack and would not allow a military response.109
In addition to responding to actual hostile acts, the military must
103

U.N. Charter art. 51.
See Grunawalt, supra note 29, at 251. An aspect upon which most legal commentators agree
relates to cyber efforts to steal information; espionage has never been regarded as the use or threat of use
of force, let alone a hostile act. Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Bloodless Weapons”? The Need to
Conduct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of Defining Them as “Weapons,”
66 A.F. L. REV. 157, 186 (2010). Thus, should the allegations of China stealing U.S. technology ever
prove true, the U.S. could not mount any kind of military response under current law. Jeremy Page,
Stealth-Espionage Claims Disputed in China, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, at A16.
105
Dunlap, supra note 52, at 85. Other scholars argue that an instrument-based approach, where one
looks at whether any existing kinetic weapon could have done the damage, and if it could, then it should
be considered as a hostile act. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2009). Others suggest a strict-liability approach where any cyberattack would be treated as an armed attack. Id. at 55.
106
Dunlap, supra note 52, at 85.
107
Id. (“The leading view, therefore, among legal experts focuses on the consequences and calls for
an effects-based analysis of a particular cyber incident to determine whether or not it equates to an
‘armed attack’ . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). Not all legal commentators agree with this idea and some
argue that because a cyber-attack is not a physical one the rules of war would not apply at all. Susan W.
Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1011,
1031 (2010) (“Since cyber[-]attacks will almost certainly not involve the use of physical force, the
Charter and the contemporary LOAC probably do not apply. If the LOAC does not apply to cyber[]attacks, a country would not commit an illegal act by deliberately launching such attacks at civilianowned targets; this distinction makes offensive cyberwarfare an attractive option for aggressive nationstates.”).
108
Gorman & Barnes, supra note 28, at A1. The Wall Street Journal reported that this idea is
favored by the Pentagon and is likely in the confidential Cyber ROE not available publically. Id.
109
Dunlap, supra note 52, at 85 (stating that consequences must extend to more than mere
inconvenience; there must be at least temporary damage of some kind). This is the kind of situation
where a law enforcement response would be more appropriate.
104
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also be allowed to respond to an intention to commit a hostile act before it
occurs. This doctrine is also sometimes referred to as anticipatory selfdefense.110 But what does a demonstration of hostile intent that would
warrant anticipatory self-defense look like in the cyber realm? Using the
above transmission of the StuxNet virus as an example, at what point could
the U.S. military interpret hostile intent and stop the virus from being
transmitted before it reaches the system? Must the military wait until the
virus has been transmitted into a system and is about to be implemented
before responding? Could it attack as soon as a foreign computer is found
trespassing in the network,111 or, could it launch a preemptory attack as soon
as a nation-state or group announces it is funding the creation of the cyberweapon? To further complicate the matter, not all interpreters of the U.N.
Charter agree that any demonstration of hostile intent can warrant a military
response.112 Those who argue against it state that unless an act is done in
conjunction with an actual attack, no response can occur.113
Despite this argument, the U.S. must continue to launch anticipatory
self-defense attacks to protect itself.114 In many ways, anticipatory selfdefense makes sense. For example, the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), a
respected body of legal literature, defines self-defense as “the use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present
occasion.”115 Under the MPC, one does not have to simply wait to be hit
before protecting oneself, rather as long as an actor believes that force is
immediately necessary to stop harm from occurring, he or she is justified in
stopping the attack before it begins.116 Although the MPC does not apply in
this arena, it supports the idea that U.S. forces cannot wait to receive a black
eye before acting; they must prevent the blow from occurring at all.
But at what point is an anticipatory attack justified? Under current
ROE, a foreign plane flying into U.S. airspace without authorization does
not meet the threshold of a demonstration of hostile intent and it cannot
110
Matthew Hoisington, Comment, Cyberwarfare and the Use of Force Giving Rise to the Right of
Self-Defense, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 450 (2009).
111
Schaap believes that trespass alone in a computer network is not enough to warrant a response.
Schaap, supra note 25, at 143. But see W. Earl Boebert, A Survey of Challenges in Attribution, in NAT’L
RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING
CYBERATTACKS 41, 42 (2010) (arguing that if a specific IP address can be found several different times
in a system “scouting the building” then that action could be interpreted as a demonstration of hostile
intent and a counter-attack could occur to stop that IP address from entering again).
112
Dunlap, supra note 52, at 86.
113
Id. at 87.
114
As an example of why anticipatory self-defense in important, in 1987 the USS Stark was sunk by
an Iraqi Mirage F-1 aircraft because the frigate waited too long in determining whether or not the aircraft
had met the threshold of hostile intent. Sagan, supra note 9, at 456–58.
115
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962).
116
Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol38/iss3/4

2013]

PROPOSED CYBERWAR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

441

simply be destroyed.117 This translates to the cyber realm as not allowing
the military to target a computer that is merely trespassing in a system.118 In
the same way, when an enemy aircraft flying close to an armed aircraft
carrier or civilian instillation opens up its bombing doors, it has done
enough to show hostile intent and, if it refuses to stand down, it can be fired
upon.119 Therefore, under this comment’s proposed cyber ROE, the
uploading of a virus or other cyber-weapon is the equivalent of the opening
of an airplane’s bombing doors and the military would be free to respond to
that threat. The proposed cyber ROE, however, goes one step further and
would allow a commander with credible intelligence of imminent use of a
cyber-weapon capable of causing destruction in the physical world to launch
an anticipatory self-defense, if authorized by higher officials.120 Intelligence
alone that a weapon is being developed, however, would not be a
demonstration of hostile intent sufficient to allow the military to attack the
laboratory.121
There is one final issue with anticipatory self-defense in cyberspace:
the duty to warn.122 Under current ROE, a commander must warn an
incoming entity that it is in violation of U.S. sovereignty and, if it continues,
it will be interpreted as a threat and fired upon.123 However, in cyberspace,
the military is not only unaware of whom the enemy is, but also lacks clear
communication channels to make contact.124 Thus, due to the rapid speed
under which cyber-attacks occur and an inability to have clear
communication to the one or thousands of attacking systems, there cannot
117

Sagan, supra note 9, at 446.
Of course, this is also fact sensitive as the mere presence of an aircraft in restricted airspace, like
the space above the White House, is a demonstration of hostile intent and would warrant a response. See
id. at 452. The question then is what types of computer networks, if any, are so crucial to national
security that mere presence could warrant a cyber-response? Aside from portions of the U.S. Military or
State Department confidential files databases and perhaps nuclear power plants, no system would seem to
be the equivalent of the White House and thus worthy of similar protection.
119
Id. at 446.
120
This standard is based off of the one currently used by the U.S. military as stated by Sagan. Id. at
447. However, unlike the traditional standard, which only allows an anticipator attack if it is “beyond
reasonable doubt” than an attack will occur, the proposed cyber ROE only uses a “credible” standard. Id.
This is due to the aforementioned problem of attack speed in cyberspace. A commander cannot wait to
ascertain beyond a reasonable doubt, at least in using stun weapons. As mentioned later in the article,
those weapons which are more destructive cyber or kinetic weapons must be fully attributed and
authorized before being use. Contra Dunlap, supra note 52, at 87 (“[I]t may behoove cyber strategists to
avoid embracing a legal interpretation that would categorize the nondestructive insertion of a cyber
capability into the computer system of another nation as either a use of force or an armed attack. The
better view today would be that such activities—without an accompanying intent for imminent action—
would not be uses of force, so long as the cyber capability lies dormant.”).
121
As this article heads to press, unnamed sources in the Pentagon suggested that the U.S. had
already decided that anticipatory self-defense, or pre-emptive strikes, were authorized under confidential
orders. See Nikhil Kumar, US Draws up Battle Plan to Stave Off Digital Attack Cyberstrikes, THE
INDEPENDENT, Feb. 4, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-draws-up-battleplan-to-stave-off-digital-attack-cyberstrikes-8480656.html.
122
Sagan, supra note 9, at 452.
123
Id.
124
It would be absurd to force the military to IM, text or email an assailant to warn them to cease
and desist.
118
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be a duty to warn in cyberspace. The proposed cyber ROE would remind
commanders that, due to the inability to warn, extra caution should be used
before launching a cyber counter-attack.125
2. Proportionality
If an attack is necessary, the current interpretation of Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter only allows a proportional military counter-attack.126
Proportionality requires a military response to be reasonable in both
duration and breadth to counter the hostile act.127 Applying this rule to the
cyber realm, the military cannot use a small computer attack to justify
destroying an entire nation, either physically or electronically. Instead, a
nation can only respond with cyber-weapons that would reasonably and
decisively counter the initial hostile act.128 Under this comment’s proposed
cyber ROE, a cyber-attack which would reach the level of an armed attack
could always be countered by using U.S. cyber-weapons which would only
stun a system and prevent in it from being used any further. How to respond
and what choice of cyber-weapon to use in that kind of situation would be
decisions that battlefield commanders could make under the cyber ROE’s
guidelines without authorization, and only to the extent necessary to counter
the hostile act.129
The use of stun attacks without authorization is supported by the
fact that those weapons would normally fall below, not only the armed
attack threshold of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, but also the use of force
threshold under Article 2(4).130 Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force
against other nations.131 If an attack is not a use of force, then a military can
employ that technique without fear of consequences.132 The U.N. recently
held that stun cyber-weapons fall below the use of force threshold.133
125
Despite an inability to warn, it could be possible to launch a “shot across the bow” to warn
attackers that they have been discovered and to desist in their assault. An example could be launching a
small DoS attack on the originating system while they are in your system to let them know that they have
been discovered and to leave immediately. The military could also repeatedly ping the incoming IP
address to let them know that they have been discovered. While these would be good practices, the
speed that cyber-attacks occur makes it impractical to do so.
126
U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Sklerov, supra note 105, at 32–33.
127
Grunawalt, supra note 29, at 251.
128
Id.
129
Current policy supports this idea and would allow a battlefield commander to respond to a cyberattack with cyber-weapons without authorization from command. For example, if a platoon of military
soldiers were suddenly fired on they would not have to radio command for authorization to engage those
people firing at them. However, because un-authorized attacks could cause explosive political issues,
only low-level weapons could be used without authorization. However, due to attribution issues to be
discussed later in this comment, caution must rule the day when using a kinetic weapon response.
130
See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 107, at 1031.
131
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
132
After all, the U.N. Charter only applies to the “use or threat of force.” Id.
133
Schaap, supra note 25, at 143. As an example, the DoS attacks recently suffered by Estonia by
un-attributed assailants were not found meet the use of force threshold. Id. at 144. Blake, another wellknown cyber strategist, agrees, stating:
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Giving a battlefield commander the flexibility to counter a real-world fast
attack without authorization by stunning an enemy system would protect
U.S. interests while limiting the probability of breaching international
law.134
What types of attacks would justify using more destructive cyberweapons or actual kinetic weapons? Cyber-attacks could rise to an
incredibly destructive level and, when they occur, happen very quickly. The
proposed cyber ROE give commanders flexibility in quickly countering a
large-scale attack with stun weapons without contacting command for
authorization. However, if large-scale or kinetic weapons are truly needed
to physically destroy an attacking system, their use must be authorized by a
higher official before being used due to its destructive force and, again, only
used as necessary to counter the hostile act. To gain authorization, a
battlefield commander would have a heightened attribution requirement
before deploying kinetic weaponry, as discussed in the next section.
3. Attribution
Current interpretations of the U.N. Charter require a counter-attack
to be attributed to some nation or group before being launched.135
Attribution has been referred to as the “single greatest challenge to the
application of the law of armed conflict to cyber activity.”136 Traditional
military attacks are generally easy to attribute. In traditional warfare,
weapons are so elaborate and expensive that typically only nation-states can
afford them.137 These expensive weapons of war are then loaded on to even
more expensive planes or ships, resplendent with battle flags or other
patriotic symbols, to be used in battle.138 Those symbols and flags are then
used to attribute an attacker. Even if an attacking force were unmarked, it is
easy to deduce a small number of probable suspects; only a few nations in
[o]ne State's use of bloodless capabilities with negligible effects in scale and
gravity in another State, especially if the effects are not directed at that State, is
unlikely to amount to a ‘threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence’ of that State, even if a military force is operating the
capability.
Blake & Imburgia, supra note 104, at 187.
134
However, just because an attack would not rise to the level of an armed attack should not give the
U.S. military carte blanche authority to attack on a whim. Clearly the U.S. military has a strong public
relations reason for being careful in how freely they attack others.
135
Levi Grosswald, Note, Cyberattack Attribution Matters Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 36
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1151, 1164 (2011).
136
Dunlap, supra note 52, at 88 (quoting Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the Use of Force in
Cyberspace, 60 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 34 (2010)). Levi Grosswald recently wrote an excellent note
discussing the problem of online attribution and the various ways to solve. See generally Grosswald,
supra note 135.
137
Most individuals or groups, no matter how wealthy, cannot afford cruise missiles, aircraft carriers
or any of the other weapons of war.
138
Interestingly, the Hague Convention only applies to belligerents who have a “fixed distinctive
emblem.” Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its
Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1078 (1998).
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the world can afford large planes with large payloads to launch elaborate
attacks.139
In cyberspace however, anyone with a computer could be sending
an attack without any kind of identifying information, although a
particularly sophisticated cyber-weapon does give a large implicit inference
of some state involvement.140 Software is generally cheap to create, easy to
share, and if deployed correctly, just as dangerous as a normal, kinetic
weapon.141 Where before civilians or smaller groups of people could not
afford to wage war against a nation-state, they can now enter the arena and
cause devastation, thereby complicating the U.S. military’s ability to
confidently attribute where an attack is coming from.142
To further complicate attribution, attacking computers can mask
their location and prohibit an aggrieved country from identifying them.143
Attackers can either make it look as if their computer is somewhere it is not,
or is precisely where indicated but under the control of an assailant
thousands of miles away.144 It is extremely difficult for a nation to attribute
an attack to an attacker that is invisible or is lying about its location.145
Thus, in the cyber realm, particularly with zombie computers or IP masking,
one can almost never be completely sure who is attacking.146 Despite these
issues, the proposed cyber ROE would allow the use of stun cyber-weapons
to fire back and disable a computer’s ability to fight without complete
attribution, since those attacks would not destroy a system but instead
disable it.
But what if an attack were longer in duration or had physically
destroyed U.S. property? The proposed cyber ROE would force the military
to meet a higher reasonable-assurance attribution requirement before
deploying more destructive cyber-weapons. The use of conventional arms,
however, would have to meet a nearly complete attribution requirement
before being deployed. The possibility of a U.S. military response that
destroyed either domestic or foreign personal property without being
completely attributed is extremely dangerous. The military cannot respond
too quickly with something that could be interpreted as an act of war.
However, if an attack were so overpowering that legitimate U.S. interests
139

See Grosswald, supra note 135, at 1166–67.
See Nancy McKenna, Stuxnet: The First Cyber “Super-Weapon?,” 6 No. 11 QUINLAN,
COMPUTER CRIME AND TECH. IN L. ENFORCEMENT, Nov. 2010, at art. 5.
141
See Condron, supra note 77, at 404.
142
See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and
Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 83 (2010).
143
Grosswald, supra note 135, at 1169.
144
Imagine the chaos that could ensue if an attacker were to attack the Kremlin using hacked
computer systems from the pentagon. If a Russian response were to destroy a U.S. system, war could
quickly ensue.
145
See Grosswald, supra note 135, at 1166–68.
146
Id. at 1168.
140
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were at stake and important property could be physically destroyed, the
ROE would give authority, with a reasonable level of attribution and
authorization, to prevent the threat from destroying U.S. property with
cyber, not kinetic, weapons.147
Justification of this proposed cyber ROE attribution solution comes
from the standing international law of the sea and piracy.148 If a pirated
English vessel were to be sunk after firing on an American port, the English
would not have any legal redress to the U.S. for the loss of that vessel.149
Instead, it is understood that nation-states have a duty to prevent their
vessels from being pirated and, if they fail in doing so, forfeit that vessel.150
In fact, the U.N. Convention on the Laws of the Sea states that “any State
having an opportunity [to take] measures against piracy, and neglecting to
do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law.”151 Some
scholars suggest that failing in that duty would not only mean the forfeiture
of the destroyed vessel but also an additional legal claim for failing to
prevent the piracy from occurring.152 The justification given for policing
piracy is the importance of the economic “choke point” areas in which pirate
activities are largest.153 Because high-volume international trade waters are
economically important to nearly all of the nations of the world, a duty to
prevent can exist.154
If vital shipping lanes are of such economic importance that a
pirated ship could not only be fired upon without identifying its affiliation,
but also force its formal owner to forfeit legal redress for its subsequent
destruction, the world-wide-web is at least as equally important
economically, and thus worthy of similar protection. Thus, just as there is a
duty to prevent piracy, there must be a duty to prevent the “pirating” of
computer systems. The proposed cyber ROE would allow a non-stun cyber147
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weapon to be launched with only reasonable authorization. The proposed
cyber ROE would put the world on notice that if they fail to prevent their
systems from being used in coordinated attacks, they might lose it either
temporary or permanently. This same duty to prevent computers from being
pirated would apply to both foreign and domestic citizens who own personal
computers.155 Obviously, foreign countries would be upset if U.S. military
forces damaged either their property or their civilian’s property but, as
stated by another scholar, “it seems unlikely that a nation would complain
very loudly if its neighbor nation returned fire against a terrorist sniper
firing from its territory.”156
Professor Duncan Hollis of Temple University recently proposed a
similar idea but suggested that the key to combating cyber-attacks is
attributing attacks and taking drastic actions to stop those actors to deter
others.157 He suggested that if a country were being attacked, that country
could send a cyber “SOS” to neighboring countries like a ship under fire
would do in the ocean.158 His proposal would thus extend a duty to respond
to an “E-SOS” to neighboring countries.159 However, his proposal seems to
overlook the fact that cyber-attacks are likely to be so swift and so crippling
that by the time a neighboring partner were to receive the message and
attribute it, the attack would be over and any counter-attack would lack the
necessity element, discussed above, to warrant a response, as there would no
longer be a reason to have to launch an attack.160 This comment’s proposed
cyber ROE offers a better approach by extending the piracy-like duty to
prevent a computer from being taken in the first place.
The proposed cyber ROE duty-to-prevent standard was also recently
used by the U.S. in the war on terror.161 After 9/11, nation-states were
warned that any nation that failed its duty to prevent terrorist attacks on
other nations would have those acts imputed to them.162 Thus, under this
comment’s proposed cyber ROE, if an attack is long in duration or causes
severe physical destruction of U.S. property, the military could, with
reasonable attribution, deploy more powerful cyber-weapons to stop the
attack, regardless of whether or not the attack were ever completely
attributed. This blanket exception would provide the possibility that the
155
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U.S. could be unknowingly attacking another nation-state. However, as in
the current state of international law towards piracy, those nation-states
would have no redress, having failed in their duty to prevent the system
from being overtaken. Any attacks could be countered with stun cyberweapons without even reasonable attribution. Kinetic attacks with realworld weapons would have to be completely attributed.
4. Distinction
One final principle mandated by the laws of war is distinction.163
Distinction under international law serves as a reminder to battlefield
commanders that they must distinguish between civilian and military targets
and that they must do all possible to minimize civilian casualties or property
destruction in a military action.164 Distinction has grown remarkably harder
to implement because in modern warfare “a government [draws] upon
national resources and mobilize[s] its entire society to gain total victory,”
civilians and their “place[] of work, railway lines, ports and . . . homes[]”
are now used to prepare for and launch attacks, and could potentially
become targets.165 Thus, under this comment’s proposed cyber ROE those
targets which have a dual purpose, those that serve both a military and
civilian use, can be targeted by military officials.166 If the U.S. was being
attacked by another nation-state or group in a large cyber onslaught, the
military could conceivably attack the civilian power network, ISPs, or dualuse buildings, with either cyber, or if completely attributed and necessary to
counter the hostile act, regular, kinetic weapons. However, because power
plants and ISPs are extremely important to civilians and humanitarian
organizations, authorization would have to be given before military leaders
could target them with any cyber-weapons, including those that would only
stun them, in order to ensure distinction is enforced. Finally, while power
plants or ISPs could conceivably be considered a dual-use system, the
proposed cyber ROE would not allow an attack on large banking websites
unless they are state-run organizations.
Distinction poses another interesting problem with cyber-attacks
since non-state actors can attack and civilian computers can be used against
their will in coordinated attacks. Can the military attack the personal
property of private citizens and observe distinction? The proposed cyber
ROE would allow the military to attack non-state actors who “directly
participate in hostilities” or who are members of a cyber-armed non-state
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actor group to be targeted by the military.167 The proposed cyber ROE will
remind commanders to limit civilian casualties, but would also allow the
U.S., under some circumstances, to attack these “direct participants” who
waive their civilian status by attacking.
But what if only the property of civilians is the direct participant in
hostilities without the intent of their owners to participate? Can the military
attack those targets? This comment’s proposed cyber ROE would allow the
military to use low-level stun weapons to disable those attacking systems.
U.S. national security concerns must outweigh the concerns of private
citizens who would be temporally prohibited from using their computers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Technology is constantly changing and the way in which people
wage war is shifting. U.S. ROE must be clear and flexible to give
commanders all that they need to protect the U.S. from incoming attacks.
When targets of national security are targeted, it is the military, not local law
enforcement, which must respond to the attack. Counter-attacks must be
carefully calculated in order to meet international guidelines that regulate
how war is to be conducted. The ROE proposed in this comment provide
the needed flexibility while staying within established international rules.
Obviously, more debate is needed on this issue, as well as the development
of mission accomplishment rules; rules that would govern the use of cyberweapons in a specific campaign or in conjunction with an offensive.
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